Mr. President, we as a

nation are obviously wrestling with the

issue of how to address the events presently

occurring in the Middle East,

specifically as they relate to Iraq. The

Congress has considered taking up a

resolution, which has been passed

around and reviewed by many of us,

but for a variety of reasons it does not

appear that we are going to take such

a resolution up during this week, and

since we are adjourning, we will not be

taking it up next week either. So I did

want to make a few comments on this

issue, because it is clearly the question

of most significance that faces our

country at this time.

I do not believe that we can address

the question of how we deal with a dictator

such as Saddam Hussein in isolation.

We have to look at the question

in the context of the other nations

which surround Iraq and in the context

of the history which has led us to this

point. This is especially true when we

deal with Iraq—or any nation in that

region of the world—because the history

of that region is so convoluted and

involves so many crosscurrents, it

being, quite literally, the crossing

point of thousands of years, of generations

of individuals, of numerous cultures

both East and West, Bagdad specifically

being the center, for literally

centuries, of commerce from the east

to the west and from the north to the

south. As a result, it was a place where

many cultures merged.

Therefore, when we as a nation, a

new nation in the context of dealing

with the Middle East, set ourselves

down in the center of that part of the

world, I think we have to be aware of

the variety of forces which come to

bear as a result of the historical events

and prejudices and attitudes and cultures

and religions that confront us

there. I am not sure that we have been,

really, in dealing with this issue.

For example, let’s begin at the outer

reaches of the question from a territorial

or geographic perception. Let’s

look at Russia. Clearly our capacity to

deal with Iraq requires our capacity to

encourage support amongst other nations

for our position. We have had

fairly limited success in that. In fact,

you might almost call this administration’s

approach to alliance relative to

Iraq as the English-speaking approach,

because, as far as I can tell, it appears

to be only English-speaking countries

who are supporting this administration’s

present policies in an open manner.

There are a few of the gulf states

that have supported us, which is something

we should not underestimate.

But as a practical matter, I have noted

with a great deal of sadness, actually,

that the White House was taking great

pride in the fact that yesterday it had

been joined by Australia in support of

its position. That’s what they were heralding.

We greatly appreciate Australia’s

support and admire them as a

nation. But I think we also recognize

that in the issue of the Middle East, it

is not Australia that is important; it is

nations such as Russia and our former

Arab allies. I say former Arab allies because

it appears that that is no longer

the case—such as Saudi Arabia and

Egypt, who are critical, and Turkey.

But in the area of Russia, for example,

this administration appears to

think that they can go to the Soviets—

to Russia, my mistake—and demand

that Russia follow our policies in Iraq

and insist on their support on Iraq, but

at the same time this administration

proposes an expansion of NATO. You

have to recognize, if you were a Russian

leader, you would find a certain

irony in a request that was coupled in

that terminology. Because, of course,

an expansion of NATO, especially to

Poland, is an expression that can only

be viewed in Russia with some concern

and possibly viewed by some as an outright

threat.

NATO expansion is represented to us

here in the United States as simply:

Well, let’s ask these three nice nations

in Eastern Europe to join us in our alliance.

But, of course, NATO is a security

issue. It is an alliance made for

the purposes of defending nations from

threat, military threat. It is not an

economic group, as everybody has

noted for many years. As a practical

matter, the capacity to expand NATO

means that you are essentially saying

to these nations that they are joining,

for the purposes of their own national

security, against some threat. What is

the threat in Eastern Europe? Of

course, the threat in Eastern Europe

has always been either Russia or Germany.

Since Germany is a member of

NATO and is not a threat, clearly an

expansion of NATO is addressing the

threat from Russia. Therefore, when we

ask Poland especially to join us in

NATO, we are saying to Poland that we

are giving you security against Russia,

and clearly we are implying, certainly

indirectly if not directly, that Russia

may be the threat.

So you can understand that Russia

might view a push to expand NATO at

the same time as we are asking them

to support us in Iraq as being inconsistent

and a bit ironic. And it reflects,

unfortunately, I think, this administration’s

failure to understand the

linkage—and linkage is the right

term—between working with a nation

like Russia and our capacity to do

things in the Middle East and moving

forward with the NATO expansion at

the exact same time. Yet, if you were

to listen to the leadership of this administration,

they will tell you that

there is no relationship, they have no

overlap on those two issues. Of course

that is not true, and that is one of the

reasons we are having problems with

Russia.

It is equally a reason that we are

having problems with our former Arab

allies. Just yesterday or the day before

yesterday—I lose track of the calendar

here when we go to Egypt—but the

Arab League met in Cairo, and they endorsed

the French and Russian proposal,

which was essentially a restatement,

to a marginal degree, of the Iraqi

proposal, as a league. The Arab League

endorsed that as a league. Why would

they do that? Because the Arab League

essentially is dominated by Egypt,

which has been our ally and which certainly,

in many ways, is a friend of our

Nation. I am a great admirer of the

Egyptian people. They have certainly

worked hard as a nation to try to bring

about a constructive result, or progress

in the Middle East in their relationship

to Israel ever since President Sadat

and through the present leadership in

Egypt.

You wonder why the Arab League

would openly endorse the French and

Russian program? Essentially, they do

it because of the situation that presently

exists in Israel and Palestine, the

fact that the peace process is, for all

intents and purposes, dead. Yet, if you

were again to listen to this administration,

as the Senator in the chair has

pointed out in a number of conferences

that we have had, this administration’s

attitude is that there is no relationship

between the peace process in Israel and

Palestine and the question of Iraq. Of

course, there is. They are intimately

related. In fact, if we were able to

make progress or to get back on line

the process of peace between Israel and

Palestine, we would probably relieve

dramatically the tension in that part

of the world and it would inevitably

lead to having support from Egypt and

Saudi Arabia, the key allies, on the

issue of how we address Iraq.

So the failure of this administration

to understand, again, the linkage between

those two issues is a failure of

fundamental proportions in their capacity

to address the Iraq issue.

The third area that this also reflects

is the issue of Turkey. Turkey is not

discussed a great deal in our Nation

and it should be discussed more because

Turkey is a unique and special

nation in relationship to ourselves.

Throughout the cold war, Turkey was

essentially the front line. It was a nation

which did not really ask for much,

yet gave us its alliance and its assistance.

We have truly, as a nation, and

this administration, as an administration,

has truly treated Turkey poorly.

This goes to the issue of Cyprus and it

goes to the issue of Greece. Yet if you

were to ask this administration, what

is the relationship between the Turkish-

Greek issue and the Cyprus issue

and the capacity to deal with Saddam

Hussein, they would say that there is

none, that there is no relationship

there. That is maybe why they have

abandoned the effort to bring to resolution

that very critical issue of international

importance. Yet we find today

that Turkey, again, is hesitant to

allow us to use its bases in order to address

the Iraq issue.

So, three major elements of the capacity

to address the Iraq issue in a coordinated

and effective way are tied to

a variety of different historical and geographic

and national and international

confrontations, which this administration

either, No. 1, doesn’t appreciate

or, No. 2, is actively ignoring.

As a result, our capacity as a country

to unite a coalition which can effectively

address Saddam Hussein has

been undermined.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent

for an additional 10 minutes?

Most critical, of course,

to this is the issue of how we deal with

Iran and the fact that, once again, this

administration has failed to reflect effectively

on the policy dealing with

that nation. Iran, as we recognize, has

been dominated by a fundamentalist

leadership which has viewed its purpose

as promoting an aggressive religious

philosophy internationally. It

has viewed the United States as its

enemy in this undertaking. But this

fundamentalism cannot survive forever.

It is much like when we confronted

the Communist leadership after

World War II and President Truman

and President Eisenhower recognized

that, through the process of constructive

containment, we would be able to

bring down that system of government

because it would fall of its own weight

because at some point, after a certain

period of years, the fundamental flaws

of that system and that philosophy

would simply undermine it and decay

it from within. And that is true also of

the fundamentalist movement in Iran.

The Muslim religion is an extremely

powerful and great religion, and it is a

religion that is based on some very

wonderful precepts. But the fundamentalism

that captured a certain element

of the Muslim believers is, as it is practiced

in Iran, inherently self-destructive.

If we are able to contain Iran but

at the same time encourage within

Iran the more moderate elements, we

will, over a period of time, see, I believe,

a collapse of the fundamentalist

energy from within and a rising of a

state which will be responsible. But

this administration has passed over a

series of opportunities to promote that

option, which has been unfortunate.

If you are going to contain Iraq, then

you must understand that in the process

of containing Iraq, you must neutralize

Iran as a threat to the region.

Because if you were to eliminate Iraq

as a force within their region, you

would create a vacuum into which a

fundamentalist Iran would step and be

a threat to its neighbors of even greater

proportions—greater proportions—

than Iraq is. So, reflecting adequately

on how we deal with Iran, and approaching

Iran as part of the solution

to how we deal with Iraq, is critical,

critical to the capacity to take on the

Iraqi issue. Yet this administration, in

my opinion, has once again left the ball

on the side of the field when it comes

to understanding or pursuing that

course of action.

So, where does that leave us? Unfortunately,

where it leaves us is with a

19th century dictator who has 20th century

weapons of mass destruction, in

Saddam Hussein, an individual who

lives by a code which is horrific to the

sensibilities of a civilized world. It is a

code that follows in the course of people

like Adolph Hitler and Mussolini

and others, who sought to promote

themselves in the name of some cause

which was really just superficial to

their own megalomania.

But our capacity to address Hussein

and to be able to deal with the situation

in Iraq is fundamentally undermined

by our inability, one, to focus on

the situation with an international alliance

and, two, to have the capacity,

because we do not have an international

alliance, to take action which

will end up being definitive.

So we find ourselves with this administration

stating that we are building

up an arms capability to make an attack

on Iraq without an alliance supporting

it with a stated objective that

nobody understands, because Secretary

Cohen has said that a military attack

will not replace Saddam Hussein, and

the President said it is not our goal to

replace Saddam Hussein. Secretary

Cohen has stated that a military attack

will not eliminate the weapons of

mass destruction, and we know that to

be the case. So what is the result of the

military attack?

There is no clear understanding as to

what it is. It will not be that Saddam

Hussein is replaced. It will not be that

the weapons of mass destruction are

eliminated. It will not be that the alliance

we had in the gulf war of 1991 are

being reinstated. I have no idea what

the conclusion of a military attack

would be.

I think the unintended consequences

of it will be dramatic. Some may be

positive. We may successfully eliminate

some weaponry that might otherwise

be used against our neighbors.

Some may be horrific. We may find

that Saddam Hussein uses his weaponry

in some other theater or some

other place. It may even be here in the

United States. But those are unintended

consequences, because there appears

to be no intended consequences.

Literally, there are no intended consequences.

If the intended consequence

is not to replace him and the intended

consequence is not to destroy the

weapons, what is the intended consequence

of military action? I don’t

know what it is. Therefore, before we

go forward with a resolution in this

body—and I understand that we are not

going to do that this week—before we

go forward with a resolution in this

body, I believe we have to bring some

definition to the purpose of the process.

I believe, first, we have to recognize

and we have to retouch our allies and

our friends and people who should be

our allies and our friends. We have to

go back to Russia and understand their

concerns. We have to go back to Turkey

and understand their concerns. We

have to go back to Egypt and understand

their concerns. We have to go to

Israel and talk about the need to get

the peace process started again and to

return to the concepts of Rabin as versus

the concepts of Netanyahu.

More important, we, as a nation,

have to know what is our purpose and

what is our goal.

I believe our purpose and goal should

be, first, to create a united approach on

this to bring into the effort an alliance

which is broader and more substantive

than what we presently have, something

more than an English-speaking

alliance.

Second, it must be to remove Saddam

Hussein and his government. We should

have as our stated goal and purpose of

any military action that we intend to

have a democratic government in Iraq.

And, third, it should be that the

weapons of mass destruction are destroyed;

not that they will survive, but

that they are destroyed.

These should be our goals, and I hope

as we move down the road to considering

the issue of what we do in Iraq and

before we move forward with military

action that we at least get some clarity

of the process, hopefully along the

lines I stated.

I appreciate the patience of the

Chair, and I especially appreciate the

patience of the Senator from Iowa.